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Taiwan's International Personality:
Crossing the River by Feeling the Stones
ANGELINE G. CHEN*
Once upon a time, fierce dragons lived at Five Tiger Gate,
guarding the seaboard entrance to the present-day port of Fuzhou,
in China's south-eastern province of Fujian. One day, venturing
forth into the depths of the sea, the dragons came upon a tiny bit of
land-shaped like a tobacco leaf-floating in the waters. They be-
gan to cavort upon the island with abandon, ploughing through the
earth and leaping with ferocity along the curving shoreline. Where
their heads surfaced at the north of the island, they threw up the
bluff at Keelung. Writhing in ecstasy and scratching their scaly
backs upon the rocky land, they coiled themselves down the spine of
the island, heaving up a jagged range of mountains. Striking the is-
land thunderous blows with their formidable tails, they created the
sheer cliffs which mark the imposing south end of what is now
called the Hengchun Peninsula. And so, Taiwan was born. 1
* Villanova University (B.A. 1988; J.D. 1993); Georgetown (LL.M. Candidate
1998). Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, INTELSAT (Washington, D.C.). The
views expressed herein are entirely those of the author and do not purport to represent or
reflect those of INTELSAT.
1. Taiwan's creation myth, reprinted in SIMON LONG, TAIWAN: CHINA'S LAST
FRONTIER 1 (1991).
223
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
I. INTRODUcTION
A small island floats on the western edge of the Philippine
Sea, nestled between the East China Sea to the north and the
South China Sea to the south. Taiwan-sometimes referred to as
lha Formosa2-is a territory consisting of a mere 36 thousand
square kilometers3 and a population of approximately 21 million
people.4 Across the Taiwan Straits, a body of water west of Tai-
wan, lies the territorial land mass known as China. China sprawls
over a vast portion of the Eurasian continent and accounts for ap-
proximately one-fifth of the world's population. 5
Slightly more than 100 miles separate the two entities geo-
graphically. 6 The distance between them in the political and dip-
lomatic arenas, however, is worlds apart. As the result of a convo-
luted and strained history of interaction, there is a direct conflict
between China and Taiwan regarding Taiwan's international
status. The People's Republic of China (China, the PRC or main-
land government) claims that Taiwan constitutes a part of its terri-
tory. The PRC asserts such a claim despite the fact that the PRC
(the political descendants of Mao Tse-Tung), even in its earlier in-
carnations, never controlled a single square inch of the land that is
now Taiwan. 7
Meanwhile, Taiwan's controlling government operates sepa-
rately and independently from China as it has done for the past
forty-seven years. Moreover, Taiwan's government has begun bol-
stering its quiet but progressive campaign for recognition of Tai-
wan as a sovereign nation-state. 8
2. The Portuguese christened the island with the name lhla Formosa, which trans-
lated means "beautiful island." See 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASIAN HISTORY 52 (1988).
3. This is approximately the equivalent of the territory of the state of Massachusetts.
See id.
4. See James W. Soong, Taiwan and Mainland China: Unfinished Business, 1 U.C.
DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 361,362 (1995).
5. See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1997, at 753,839 (1996).
6. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASIAN HISTORY, supra note 2, at 520. Even less distance
exists between mainland China and several islands that the Taiwanese government con-
trols which lie within the Straits. For instance, Quemoy Island is within 35 miles of
China's shoreline in the Fujian province. Access to Quemoy is restricted to military and
government personnel. Quemoy is also referred to as Kinmen.
7. See discussion infra Part IV.C.1.
8. Until 1991, the government of the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC or Taiwan
government) insisted that it was the sole representative government of Taiwan and China.
The ROC has since relinquished this position, to the extent of implicitly recognizing the
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Historically, the international community has maneuvered to
maintain relations with both the PRC and Taiwan, attempting to
preserve the benefits of continued contact with both.9 Thus, the
historical policy of "one country, two governments" embraced by
both the PRC and Taiwan has belied the reality of "two countries,
two governments" for nearly half a century.
Since 1991, strong factions within the Taiwanese population-
governed by a democratic government since 1993-have publicly
voiced their demands for international recognition of Taiwan's de
facto sovereignty. 10 Taiwan openly campaigned for United Na-
tions' membership as a sovereign nation in 1993.11 China, how-
ever, continues to steadfastly insist that Taiwan is a "renegade
province" of China with which it will inevitably reunify. Moreo-
ver, China has consistently asserted that a Taiwanese declaration
of independence will result in an immediate invasion of the island
to reinforce the Chinese claim of sovereignty over Taiwan. 12
For a number of political, diplomatic, and other reasons, the
majority of nations today officially recognize the PRC as the rep-
resentative government of China.13 Subsumed within these official
PRC. In May of 1991, Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui officially recognized that the po-
litical body in Beijing controlled the mainland. See Jeremy Mark, Taiwan, in Historic
Gesture, Says it Recognizes Leadership of China, WALL ST. J., May 1, 1991. In 1994, the
Mainland Affairs Council (a Taiwanese governmental agency created to address main-
land China-Taiwan concerns and issues) announced that Taiwan's government would
cease competing for the right to represent China in the international community. See
Virginia Sheng, Taipei Calls for an End to China Representation Argument, July 8, 1994,
FREE CHINA JOURNAL, at 1, available in 1994 WL 11284297.
9. See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
10. See Party Told to Clarify Independence Path, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 12,
1996; see also Ross H. Munro, Taipei Merits U.N. Place, FREE CHINA JOURNAL, Dec. 2,
1994.
11. See, e.g., David 0. Lloyd, Succession, Secession, and State Membership in the
United Nations, 26 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 134 (1994). Taiwan became a member of the
United Nations in 1949 and fulfilled its obligations for 22 years, until the PRC was admit-
ted in 1971, stating that there was only "one China." See U.N. Blocks Move to Admit
Taiwan, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 22, 1994, at A17.
12. For instance, in the summer of 1995 during a turbulent political period in Taiwan
because of upcoming elections, China began "testing" missiles in the waters of the Taiwan
Straits. The general consensus regarding this activity was that China hoped to quell inde-
pendence movements in Taiwan. The maneuvering was specifically intended to intimi-
date those who might otherwise be tempted to support the Democratic Progressive Party,
a minority political opposition party that has openly proclaimed Taiwan independence as
one of its party goals. See China Slams Support for Taiwan's U.N. Bid, UNITED PRESS
INT'L, July 24, 1996.
13. See Tzu-Wen Lee, The International Legal Status of the Republic of China on
Taiwan, 1 UCLA. J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 351, 351-52 (1996-97). A minority of soy-
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relations is an acknowledgment, although not necessarily accep-
tance, of China's territorial claims. Notwithstanding this "official"
position, the majority of nations concurrently maintain
"unofficial" trade, political and cultural relations with Taiwan as
though Taiwan was a sovereign nation. 14 This inconsistent ap-
proach in dealing with the two governments forces other countries
to use delicate language when describing their relationships with
the PRC. Many nations either expressly or implicitly treat the
status of Taiwan as an "internal Chinese matter. ' 15 Using this ap-
proach, nations have been able to avoid direct confrontation on
the issue of Taiwan's sovereignty.
So far, this dual existence has survived this treatment. Yet
current events indicate that the status quo cannot sustain itself in-
definitely.16 Since Taiwan established its democratic government,
ereign nation-states officially recognize Taiwan in lieu of recognizing China. These states,
however, tend to be smaller developing countries with weaker voices and little power or
influence in the international community as a whole. See id. at 360.
14. See, e.g., Cheri Attix, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Are Taiwan's
Trading Partners Implying Recognition of Taiwanese Statehood?, 25 CAL. W. INT'L L.J.
257 (1995) (discussing extension of unofficial trade and cultural relations to Taiwan by
nation-states despite official recognition of the PRC as the representative of China, and
the possibility that recognition of Taiwan's statehood can be deduced from this conduct).
15. See, e.g., Shanghai Communiqu6, U.S.-P.R.C., 11 I.L.M. 443 (1972); Commu-
niqu6, Mar. 13, 1972, U.K.-P.R.C., reprinted in KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES
25171 (1972). The comments of the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs to
the House of Commons were as follows:
From the very beginning of our discussion the Chinese side made clear to us
their position that Taiwan was an inalienable part of Chinese territory and that
this was a principle to which the Chinese Government attached the greatest im-
portance. Our position,... which was made clear to the Chinese from the start
of the negotiations, is that the Canadian Government does not consider it ap-
propriate either to endorse or to challenge the Chinese Government's position
on the status of Taiwan. This has been our position and it continues to be our
position. As the communiqu6 says, we have taken note of the Chinese Govern-
ment's statement about Taiwan. We are aware that this is the Chinese view and
we realize the importance they attach to it, but we have no comment to make
one way or the other.
22 EXTERNAL AFI. 378 (1970), quoted in Lee, supra note 13, at 358.
16. The collision course on which the current situation is headed is recognizable, par-
ticularly in light of recent events such as the 1989 incident of Tiananmen Square and
China's developing treatment of Hong Kong after Hong Kong reverted to China. The
incompatibility of China's and Taiwan's views with regard to Taiwan's status is viewed as
creating instability and security concerns on the international level. See, e.g., Soong, su-
pra note 4, at 361 ("Conflict between mainland China and Taiwan continues to represent
one of the most significant threats to economic and political stability in the Pacific Rim.");
Attix, supra note 14 (discussing international practice of extending official recognition to
PRC while, nevertheless, carrying on unofficial trade and cultural relations with Taiwan);
Taiwan Politics: Is Taiwan Still a Province?, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 25, 1997, at 35
(referring to renewed suspicions in both Taiwan and China regarding President Lee's
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it has steadfastly demanded recognition as a nation-state inde-
pendent from China. Moreover, notwithstanding the need for po-
litical expedience, other factors appear to support Taiwan's right
to sovereignty including principles of international law on human
rights, the right of self-determination, the right to democratic self-
governance, and freedom from economic coercion. All of these
principles have gained strength in the international community
during the past decade. These principles furnish further reason to
question and re-examine the current situation and to discuss its
resolution, including the possibility of according Taiwan recogni-
tion as an independent nation.
This Article examines Taiwan's de facto statehood and estab-
lishes that Taiwan is, for all practical purposes, an independent
and sovereign state, prevented from openly seeking international
recognition because of China's illegal threats of force. To further
obstruct Taiwan's bid for statehood, China has threatened to pro-
hibit trading access to its markets to any nation that acknowledges
Taiwan's claim of sovereignty. This Article argues that China's
sole "justification" for such behavior-its claim of sovereignty
over Taiwan as part of China-is insupportable and based upon
false premises.
Part II of this Article provides a brief overview of Taiwan's
history, specifically focusing on its geography and on foreign occu-
pation of Taiwan. Part III sets forth Taiwan's political framework,
which cannot be overlooked in any analysis of Taiwan's interna-
tional personality as it exists today. Part IV assesses Taiwan's
fulfillment of the various indicators of statehood, along with a
number of legal theories upon which Taiwan could rely in declar-
ing its statehood and sovereignty. Part V analyzes and refutes
China's stated justifications for its claim of sovereignty over Tai-
wan. The Article concludes that Taiwan's de facto statehood
should be recognized and that Taiwan be granted the benefits at-
tached to statehood. To accomplish this, however, the world
community must recognize its responsibility to uphold basic tenets
of international law and both challenge and resist China's coercive
tactics aimed at denying Taiwan recognition as a sovereign nation-
state. Only then can the Taiwan-China situation be resolved.
commitment to reunification).
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IL A BRIEF HISTORY OF TAIWAN 17
The first documentation of Chinese interest in Taiwan was in
605 A.D., when the Sui Emperor, Yang-ti, sent several exploratory
groups to investigate the island18 The expeditions discovered
various groups of native tribes inhabiting the lowland and moun-
tainous regions of the island.19 The explorers kidnapped a few of
the aborigines and brought them back to the Sui Court to serve as
slaves and curiosities.20 China's interest in Taiwan, however,
faded quickly. Other than these expeditions and a few other brief
encounters during that century, the subsequent rulers of mainland
China essentially ignored the tiny island's existence. This contin-
ued until the collapse of the Ming Dynasty in 1662.21
During the second half of the thirteenth century, Chinese
from the coastal provinces of Fujian and Guandong migrated to
Taiwan, fleeing persecution of the Mongolian. 22 Throughout this
time period, increasing dissatisfaction with China's central gov-
ernment in Beijing created chronic unrest among the Chinese liv-
ing along China's coastal regions. The Chinese government, fear-
ing pirate fleets that operated from MaKung, subjected many of
these people to compulsory dislocation. 23 This displacement even-
tually led to additional migrations from the mainland to Taiwan.
17. See generally LONG, supra note 1; GEORGE H. KERR, THE TAIWAN CON-
FRONTATION CRISIS (1986); JACQUES GERNET, A HISTORY OF CHINESE CIVILIZATION
(1985); THE CAMBRIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHINA (2d ed., 1982); Yu-ming Shaw,
Modern History of Taiwan:t An Interpretive Account, in CHINA AND THE TAIWAN ISSUE
(Hung-dah Chiu ed., 1979); W.G. GODDARD, FORMOSA: A STUDY IN CHINESE
HISTORY (1966).
18. See KERR, supra note 17, at 11.
19. The origins of the aboriginal groups, which currently constitute less than one per-
cent of Taiwan's population, are debated. See LONG, supra note 1, at 3-4. At least two
different tribes are identifiable. The first tribe known as Taiyals and Vonums inhabited
the north end of the island, and are generally surmised to be ethnically linked to the Ainu
people of the Japanese island of Hokkaido. See id. The PRC disputes this view and
claims that the Taiyals and Vonums are descendants of mainland Chinese immigrants who
reached Taiwan around 1700 B.C. The second tribe is believed to be descendants of early
Malaysians and Filipinos who settled on the south end of the island, also sometime during
the centuries before Christ.
20. See id
21. See id.
22. See Parris Chang and Kok-Ui Lim, Taiwan's Case for United Nations Member-
ship, 1 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 393,405 (1996-97).
23. This forced displacement became a recurring event. In the 1600s, in an effort to
isolate Taiwan which had become occupied by the Ming resistance, the central Chinese
government mandated that the coastal inhabitants in Fujian, Guangdong and Zhejiang be
evacuated inland at least 10 miles or more. See id at 12.
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Laws passed to prevent these migrations proved futile.
In addition to the limited Chinese exploration efforts, for-
eigners established colonies and trading ports on Taiwan and its
neighboring islands. Foreign traders and pioneers settled in Tai-
wan throughout the twelfth century, growing sugar-cane, tea and
rice for trade in the mainland.24 Portuguese traders settled at Ma-
cao in the 1500s, followed soon thereafter by the Spanish, who set-
tled in Manila. 25 In 1592, Japanese merchants received special
permission from the Shogun to engage in foreign commerce, and
established themselves on the northern part of Taiwan.
Toward the end of the sixteenth century, the Dutch aggres-
sively pursued trade with China through the Dutch East India
Company.26 Rebuffed by Chinese refusals to allow them a trading
post in China, the Dutch constructed a naval base on the Pesca-
dore Islands to compete with the Portuguese trading channels and
to provide security for their own trading posts.27 Galvanized by
the threat of actual war between the Dutch and the Portuguese,
China sought to appease the Dutch by offering them a trading post
in Taiwan. China hoped to displace the Dutch by sending them to
a location infamous for piracy and disease.28 The Dutch, mean-
while, agreed and established a settlement in the southwest region
of Taiwan. 29 Thereafter, the Dutch gradually expanded their con-
trol.30 As noted by one scholar, this colonization was perhaps the
first documented instance of a peculiar and repetitive feature of
Taiwan's history, "its handing over by one foreign power that did
not control it to another with no obvious claim to sovereignty. '' 31
The Dutch controlled the island until 1662, when Cheng
Ch'eng-kung, also known as Koxinga, expelled them.32 Koxinga, a
Ming loyalist and military leader, attempted to thwart the Man-
chus, which eventually led to the establishment of the Ch'ing dy-
nasty.33 By 1664, however, the Chinese forced Koxinga's armies to
retreat to Taiwan. Subsequently, Koxinga's armies turned their
24. See id. at 5.
25. See id. at 7-8.
26. See id. at 8.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id at 9.
30. See id at 9-10.
31. See id. at 8.
32. See JOHN F. COPPER, TAIWAN: NATION-STATE OR PROVINCE? 25-26 (1996).
33. See id
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wrath upon the Dutch and expelled them from the island.34 From
1662 to 1683, Koxinga ruled Taiwan as the last outpost of the Ming
Dynasty.35 In 1683, the Ch'ing attacked Taiwan, defeated the re-
sistance movement, and claimed Taiwan as part of the Chinese
Empire.36 Taiwan became part of the Fujian province and was
made a Chinese prefecture and military district in 1684.37
The international community did not dispute China's claim of
sovereignty over Taiwan until the end of the Sino-Japanese War in
1894-1895.38 China, weak from its continuous internal border dis-
putes as well as the war over Korea (from which it had demanded
tributary), was defeated. As a result, Taiwan and the Pescadores
were handed over to Japan in 1895, along with various economic
concessions in accordance with the Treaty of Shimonoseki. 39 Once
again, Taiwan changed hands without being consulted, and Taiwan
and the Pescadores became Japan's first full-fledged colonies.40
Taiwan remained under Japanese rule until the Allied Forces
forced the Japanese to surrender the island to the Nationalist gov-
ernment (Kuomintang or KMT) of Taiwan in 1949.41 The Allied
Forces' decision forcing Japan to relinquish its claim to the island
territory proved to be the watershed event that laid the foundation




37. LONG, supra note 1, at 13.
38. See Ray E. Johnston, Comments Assessing the International Status of Partitioned
Nations: Theories and Findings, in MULTI-SYSTEM NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF GERMANY, KOREA AND CHINA 36, 38-39 (Hungdah
Chiu & Robert Downen eds., 1981).
39. Treaty of Shimonoseki, Apr. 17, 1895, Japan-P.R.C., art. II, (entered into force
May 8,1895), available in TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS WITH AND CONCERNING CHINA
1894-1919, 18-19 (John V. A. MacMurray ed., 1921). The Taiwanese population com-
plained about the cession to Japan and actually declared Taiwan as a republic in the
hopes of obtaining assistance from the international community, but to no avail.
40. The Treaty of Shimonoseki permitted any of Taiwan's inhabitants to return to the
mainland. See id. art. V, at 20. All persons staying on Taiwan automatically became
Japanese subjects in 1897. See id.
41. The Japanese signed a peace treaty officially ending the war on July 8, 1951. See
Japan to Accept Russian Control of Sakhalin IS., MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, Dec. 2, 1996, at
[Vol. 20:223
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III. TAIWAN'S POLITICAL FRAMEWORK
White cat, black cat: what does it matter as long as it catches
mice?42
The political framework under which Taiwan currently oper-
ates, originated with the influx of Nationalist forces in the early
1940's. At that time, the Nationalist government that controlled
China, led by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, was entangled in a
civil war against its former ally, the Chinese Communist Party led
by Mao Tse-tung.43 By 1945, Taiwan had come under the KMT's
control. Although Taiwan was still considered a colony of Japan,
the Nationalist party established itself as the governing body of
Taiwan.44
In December of 1949, after two decades of civil war, the
Kuomintang were driven from the mainland and forced to retreat
to Taiwan.45 Despite its ouster from control of the mainland, the
KMT refused to acknowledge defeat by the Communists, and
continued to declare itself as the legitimate government of all
China. Chiang gathered his remaining forces in Taiwan and estab-
lished a supposed "interim" capital of China in Taipei.
46
Along with the Nationalist forces, an estimated two million
Kuomintang refugees fled to Taiwan. Japan, meanwhile, occupied
with its misfortune of losing World War II, had no energy or re-
sources to either repel or oust the influx of Chinese from the
mainland.
Another critical factor in Japan's loss of control over Taiwan
was the Allied Forces' decision to divest Japan of territories that it
had seized from its neighboring countries.47 The Allied Forces re-
quired Japan to relinquish control of its Taiwan and Pescadores
territories. 48 This objective was declared at the Cairo Conference
in December of 1943 and later affirmed in the 1945 Potsdam
42. Orville Schell, Deng Xiaoping, August 22, 1904 - February 19, 1997; Deng's
Revolution, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 3, 1997, at 20.
43. See iU.
44. See generally CHINA: SEVENTY YEARS AFTER THE HSIN-HAI REVOLUTION
(Hungdah Chiu & Shao-Chuan Leng eds., 1984).
45. See id.
46. See id
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Proclamation.49 On October 25, 1945, Japan surrendered Taiwan
to the Kuomintang government in Taipei.50
Prior to Japan's surrender, Taiwan had been subject to Japa-
nese rule for over forty years.51 The decision to "hand over" Tai-
wan to the Kuomintang was made without consulting the island's
inhabitants-those who had lived on the island prior to the
Kuomintang's arrival. Once again, the tiny island changed owners
without prior consultation of its inhabitants.
Many of the Taiwanese initially welcomed the arrival of the
Kuomintang, seeing it as their liberator from the long and often
harsh Japanese rule.52 Upon their arrival, the KMT imposed its
governmental structure (imported from China) to replace the
Japanese law. Soon after the establishment of the Nationalist gov-
ernment, however, the Taiwanese found the KMT rule to be even
harsher and more brutal than the Japanese regime, and often arbi-
trary and inconsistent in its application of the law.
53
During the first fifteen months of the KMT's rule, Taiwan's
intellectual elite were targeted, arrested, and often beaten.54 Any-
one suspected of conspiring or befriending the Japanese was under
suspicion.55 The KMT quickly suppressed any resistance by the
49. See id
50. See id
51. See id. at 6. The length of Japan's occupation of Taiwan created unique societal
and linguistic idiosyncrasies. For example, the author's oldest living aunt learned Japa-
nese as her primary language. She learned to speak Taiwanese only from conversations
held with family members. See id at 8 (noting that the Japanese forced the Taiwanese to
learn Japanese in lieu of the Taiwanese language).
52. See COPPER, supra note 32, at 34-47.
53. See generally THE FUTURE OF TAIWAN: A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION (Victor H.
Li ed., 1980) (containing several participants at conference relaying stories of the KMT's
harsh and unjust treatment to native Taiwanese).
54. The treatment of the Taiwanese was left completely to the discretion of the KMT
police forces. Taiwanese were subsequently abused, terrorized, jailed and tortured with-
out trial or redress by the legal system for the slightest or perceived connections to the
Japanese. The KMT police, at its discretion, also executed many Taiwanese without trial.
The author's own maternal grandfather, who had held some amount of sway as a local
leader in the Pescadores during the Japanese rule of Taiwan, was arrested, interrogated,
and thrown into prison without trial for approximately a week. Likewise, the author's
fraternal grandmother and uncle (who was only a year old at the time) were also arrested
and thrown in jail without trial for purchasing previously Japanese-owned property. They
were held in jail for approximately six weeks before the KMT forces, considering the
baby's age, granted leniency and released them. See Chang & Lim, supra note 22, at 412-
16.
55. See COPPER, supra note 32, at 34.
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Taiwanese, who felt betrayed by their supposed liberators.56 The
KMT established a policy mandating that Mandarin Chinese be
taught in schools and that it be used to conduct business, despite
the fact that the majority of Taiwanese could not speak Mandarin.
Subsequently, Taiwan was placed under martial law, which re-
mained in place until 1987. 57
The KMT justified the imposition of martial law as part of
their continued "fight" against the Communist government and
need to focus their efforts to invade the mainland to recover their
power. Martial law also provided the means through which the
KMT could continue its oppression of the native Taiwanese
population under the aegis of an "emergency" created by the
KMT's overarching pursuit of preparing to invade and recapture
the mainland.
Another result of the KMT's imposition of martial law was
that the bureaucrats from China, who were forced into exile in
Taiwan by Mao's troops, were able to retain power.58 The KMT
politicians claimed that retention of their legislative positions
maintained order and provided continuity to the KMT's mission of
recovering the mainland. They also justified their retention of
power as legitimization of the KMT's claim of being a continuous
and functioning government. Accordingly, the KMT was able to
avoid holding elections which might otherwise have diluted its po-
litical power. Consequently, Taiwan's political system was a one-
party system for nearly forty years. The KMT criminalized and
dealt harshly with attempts to create other political parties displays
56. See id. The feelings of rebellion and resistance to KMT rule on the Taiwanese
finally erupted into civil disobedience throughout the entire island in 1947. On February
28th of that year, the police caught an old Taiwanese woman selling black-market ciga-
rettes by the police. She was beaten severely and killed. Bystanders, observing the inci-
dent turned into an angry mob which threatened the police officers. In turn, the officers
fired into the crowd, killing four people and injuring countless others. See id. at 35. The
Taiwanese arose en masse to protest the event, which became known as the infamous "2-
28 Incident." In response, approximately 5000 armed troops were brought in from the
mainland to quell the disturbance. It is estimated that anywhere from 10,000 to 20,000
(depending on the source of statistics) unarmed Taiwanese were massacred, including the
majority of Taiwan's local leaders, artists and intelligentsia. See id at 36. The 2-28 Inci-
dent was rarely mentioned in ensuing decades. It was not until 48 years later in 1995
when President Lee Teng-hui (himself Taiwanese) issued a formal apology on behalf of
the government. See id.
57. The KMT's governance over Taiwan was rife with abuse and oppression of the
Taiwanese. Martial law was employed as a method of suppressing Taiwanese "rebels."
See 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASIAN HISTORY, supra note 2, at 53.
58. See WACHMAN, supra note 47, at 11.
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of support for the Communists or any government other than the
KMT, and any discussion of Taiwan independence.
59
Following the KMT's defeat by the Communist Chinese, the
majority of the international community continued to recognize
the KMT as the legal government of China. 60 For nearly twenty-
two years, the KMT's delegation to the United Nations repre-
sented China in both the United Nations General Assembly and
the Security Council. 61 Western powers, in particular the United
States, supported the KMT's position as the legitimate government
of China. The United States recognized the value the KMT had
within the context of the Cold War. The KMT's delegation to the
United Nations, however, was strenuously contested by the PRC.
Following Japan's surrender of Taiwan to the KMT after
World War II, a delegation from Taiwan represented China in the
United Nations for twenty-two years. As the "China" representa-
tive to the United Nations, Taiwan had maintained a seat in the
General Assembly, as well as a permanent seat on the Security
Council. On October 25, 1971, however, the PRC replaced Tai-
wan and was seated in the U.N. China seat. Seventy-six countries
voted in favor of Taiwan's ouster, with seventeen abstaining and
thirty-five voting against the ouster.62 This step marked the inter-
national community's recognition of the Communist Chinese as
the legitimate representative government of China.63 The PRC in-
terpreted this event as yet another indicator legitimizing its claim
of sovereignty over Taiwan.64
As discussed infra, however, Resolution 2758, which enabled
the switch, only determined that the PRC, not the KMT, was
China's legitimate government and, therefore, should be China's
representative to the United Nations. The Resolution did not de-
termine whether the PRC's representation of China included rep-
resentation of Taiwan.65 Thus, Resolution 2758, while resolving
59. The KMT's martial law on Taiwan was not lifted until 1987. See Sean Cooney,
Why Taiwan is not Hong Kong: A Review of the PRC's, "One Country Two Systems"
More for Reunification with Taiwan, 6 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 497, 518-19 (1997).
60. See U.S. Dept. of State Report on Diplomatic Relations of the Republic of China
and the People's Republic of China, available in 11 I.L.M. 571 (1972).
61. See COPPER, supra note 32, at 145.
62. See PETER R. BAEHR & LEON GORDENKER, THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE
1990s 45 (1992).
63. See Chang, supra note 22, at 394.
64. See Part V.A.1, 2.
65. See Lee, supra note 13, at 351; Chang & Lim, supra note 22. Both articles note
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the issue of China's representation, left the determination of Tai-
wan's representation unclear.
Resolution 2758 forced the KMT to relinquish its U.N. seat.
The KMT, however, continued to govern and exercise total control
over Taiwan as it had prior to the Resolution's passage.
In defiance of the martial law imposed upon Taiwan, the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was formed in September of
1986.66 Confronting the KMT, the DPP openly advocated inde-
pendence for Taiwan. Despite the illegality of the DPP's forma-
tion, the KMT took no action against it,67 and the DPP ran as a
political party in the December 1986 elections. 68 Thus, the 1986
elections represented the first two-party elections held at the na-
tional level in any Chinese nation. Martial law was finally lifted in
1987.69 One year later, Lee Teng-Hui, a native Taiwanese, be-
came President of Taiwan. 70 Lee was the first native Taiwanese to
hold an influential political position within the KMT governmental
structure since its establishment in 1949.
By 1989, a multi-party system had emerged. Thirty-eight po-
litical parties participated in the 1989 elections, and 75% of voters
turned out for the election. An observer commented that the
election was "the first open, free, fair election ever conducted in
Chinese history."'71 In 1991, the National Assembly held elections,
followed by Legislative Yuan elections a year later.72 By 1993, the
Taiwanese were on their way to establishing a truly democratic
government. In March 1996, Taiwan held a popular election for
State President, the first ever in Chinese history. Today, other
countries in East Asia see Taiwan as a role model for democrati-
zation, even while Taiwan's own international status remains un-
certain.73
the failure of Resolution 2758 to address the issue of Taiwan's representation.
66. See Piero Tozzi, Constitutional Reform On Taiwan: Fulfilling a Chinese Notion of
Democratic Sovereignty?, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1193, 1240 (1995).
67. See Cooney, supra note 58, at 518-19.
68. See Michael E. Mangelson, Taiwan Re-recognized: A Model for Taiwan's Future
Global Status, 1992 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 231,251 (1992).
69. See Lin, supra note 58, at 772.
70. President Chiang Ching-Kuo (Chiang Kai-Shek's son) died in 1988 at the age of
74. See Tozzi, supra note 62, at 1239. Although Chiang designated Lee as his successor,
serious power struggles arose within the KMT. It.
71. Ts'ai Ling and Ramon H. Myers, Winds of Democracy: The 1989 Elections, in
ASIAN SURVEY 360 (1990).
72. See WACHMAN, supra note 47, at 11.
73. See Taiwarn Now for the Rest of the Banquet, THE ECONOMIST, July 12,1997, at 36.
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IV. TAIWAN SHOULD BE ACCORDED STATEHOOD AND ALL THE
APPURTENANCES THERETO
Every Nation which governs itself, under whatever form, and
which does not depend on any other Nation, is a sovereign State. Its
rights are, in the natural order, the same as those of every other
State. Such is the character of the moral persons who live together
in a society established by nature and subject to the law of Nations.
To give a Nation the right to a definite position in this great society,
it need only be truly sovereign and independent. It must govern it-
self by its own authority and its own laws.74
A. Taiwan Fulfills the Criteria for Statehood
The traditional requirements for statehood, as set forth in the
1933 Montevideo Convention, are: (1) a defined territory; (2) a
permanent population; (3) an effective government; and (4) the
capacity to enter into relations with other states.75 While the Mon-
tevideo Convention is technically binding only upon its signatories,
the formulation for statehood as set forth therein has been gener-
ally accepted throughout the international community. 76 Taiwan
adequately fulfills all of these classic criteria for statehood. 77 Ad-
ditionally, while democratic governance was recently advocated as
74. See E. de Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, ou principles de la loi naturelle, appliques d la
conduite et aux affaires des nations et des souverains I, ch. I, § 4 (James Brown Scott ed.,
1758).
75. See Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, art. 1, 49 Stat. 3097, 165
L.N.T.S. 25 (signed at Montevideo, Uruguay Dec. 26 1993) [hereinafter Montevideo Con-
vention]; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 201 (1987).
76. See generally Nii Lante Wallace-Bruce, CLAIMS TO STATEHOOD IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 51 (1994).
77. It is undisputed that Taiwan meets the four criteria set forth in the Montevideo
Convention. See, e.g., Attix, supra note 14, at 366-68 (setting forth brief summary of Tai-
wan's fulfillment of traditional criteria for statehood). This Article, therefore, does not
present a comprehensive discussion on how Taiwan meets the statehood criteria.
A peripheral issue sometimes arises regarding the first criteria of a defined terri-
tory. As noted above, China refuses to relinquish its claim of sovereignty over Taiwan.
Pre-existing claims as to the territory of a would-be State, however, do not prevent quali-
fication for statehood. For example, prior and continuing claims of territorial ownership
for which statehood is being claimed have commonly been raised within the context of the
disputed territory's quest for admission to the United Nations. Presumably, so long as
Taiwan disputes China's claim, the issue remains unresolved. See JAMES CRAWFORD,
THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 37-38 (1979) (noting that such
claims existed in the case of Israel, Kuwait and Mauritania, and that these countries are
seen as nation-states despite claims made to challenge the respective territories). "The
only requirement is that the State must consist of a certain coherent territory effectively
governed." Id. at 40.
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a non-traditional fifth requirement of establishing statehood, Tai-
wan has met this requirement through the establishment of a
democratic political system in 1993.78
The criteria set forth in the Montevideo Convention are ad-
mittedly neither exhaustive nor exclusive. Under any analysis,
however, Taiwan has all the attributes of a nation state, except for
explicit recognition from the international community. Taiwan
has also fulfilled a few additional indicators of independent state-
hood which are discussed below. These indicators bolster Tai-
wan's entitlement to recognition as a sovereign nation-state.
1. State Responsibility
State responsibility is another strong indicator of statehood
and sovereignty. If Taiwan were part of China, then China would
be liable for Taiwan's actions under international law. Histori-
cally, however, the governing body of Taiwan has consistently
been held accountable for the actions of the island's inhabitants.79
In early 1996, six Taiwanese sailors from the merchant con-
tainer ship Maersk Dubai were arrested in Nova Scotia, Canada.8 0
The six men, all officers, were accused of murdering three Roma-
nian stowaways on the high seas. This incident became the focal
point of a diplomatic tussle between Canada, Romania, China, and
Taiwan over who had jurisdiction over the matter.81
Canada initially sought to extradite the officers to Romania,
with which it has an extradition treaty.8 2 Taiwan, however, op-
posed the extradition attempts and offered instead to prosecute
78. See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J.
INTL L. 46, 55 (1992); see also M. Kelly Malone, The Rights of Newly Emerging Demo-
cratic States Prior to International Recognition and the Serbo-Croatian Conflict, 6 TEMP.
INT'L & COMp. L.J. 81, 86 n.27 (1992) (citing J.E.S. Fawcett, Security Council Resolutions
on Rhodesia, 41 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 103, 112 (1965-66)) (adding fifth requirement for es-
tablishing statehood as "the right of every citizen to participate in the government.").
79. For example, China refused to assume responsibility for the massacre of ship-
wrecked Japanese who were killed by Taiwanese in 1874. See Chang & Lim, supra note
22, at 418.
80. Canada to Release Crewmen: Taiwan Promises Thorough Prosecution of Six
"Maersk Dubai" Officers, CHINA NEWS, March 20, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, China News (Taiwan) File [hereinafter Canada to Release Crewmen].
81. See id
82. No extradition treaty exists between Canada and Taiwan. See Officers to Return
to Taiwan for Trial, TRAFFIC WORLD, Mar 24, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library,
International Section, Traffic World File. Canada's extradition treaty with Romania,
however, encompasses only offenses committed on Romanian soil. The alleged murders
had taken place on the high seas on a ship registered in Taiwan. See iL
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the men in Taipei.83 Meanwhile, the PRC attempted to intervene,
claiming sovereignty over both the men and the case.84 An official
representative of China declared, "Taiwan is part of China and is
an integral part of its territory, so we have the jurisdiction ....
The Taiwanese government has no part to play." 85 This official
emphasized that extradition could take place only between two
sovereign states, not "between a province of a country and another
country." 86
Despite China's position, the Nova Scotia Supreme Court de-
cided to return the men to Taiwan to stand trial there.87 Taiwan
hailed the decision, noting that "[t]he decision not only complies
with international laws and practices, but also shows Canada's re-
spect for our judicial system."' 88
The Maersk Dubai case illustrates the ambiguity created by
Taiwan's indeterminate status within the international community.
Nevertheless, the statements issued by the Chinese officials are ac-
curate: under international law, one sovereign state cannot extra-
dite an individual to anything other than another sovereign state.
If Taiwan did not hold the attributes of a nation-state independent
and apart from China, the officers could not have been released
from the Canadian courts to stand trial in Taiwan.
2. Trade and Economic Power
It is indisputable that trade and economic power largely de-
fine relations between members of the international community.
The spectacular growth of Taiwan's trading base demonstrates that
it cannot be easily dismissed in the trade arena.89 Attendant with
Taiwan's explosive economic progress over the past four decades
have been extensive improvements in Taiwan's political, social,
educational, and health spheres. These advancements have
83. Canada to Release Crewmen, supra note 80.
84. See Steve MacLeod, China Claims Jurisdiction, CALGARY HERALD, Jan. 31,
1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, News (Canadian Press) File.
85. See id (quoting Xie Xiaoyan, an embassy official with the Chinese Embassy in
Ottawa).
86. See id.
87. See Taiwan Hails Canada's Return of Murder Suspects, REUTERS, Mar. 19, 1997,
available in LEXIS, News Library, News file.
88. Id. (quoting Taiwan's Foreign Ministry spokesman Peter Cheng).
89. See, e.g., Chi-Ming Hou, Toward Taiwan's Full Participation in the Global System,
in THE CHINESE AND THEIR FUTURE: BEIJING, TAIPEI AND HONG KONG (Zhiling Lin &
Thomas W. Robinson eds., 1994).
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strengthened Taiwan's internal structure, allowing Taiwan to con-
tribute to the stability and growth of the global economy.
90
In comparison to the rest of the world (including mainland
China), Taiwan has the twentieth largest economy, the eighteenth
largest GNP, the fourteenth largest trade economy and the sev-
enth highest level of foreign investment. It has its own foreign cur-
rency, the New Taiwan dollar, tied to the U.S. dollar.91 The Tai-
wan government negotiates its own trade deals with other nations,
including the United States, independent of the PRC. While
China currently lags decades behind in numerous respects, Taiwan
has built and supports an institutional framework for a thriving
market economy.
In most, if not all, aspects of trade and economy, Taiwan op-
erates as a separate and sovereign nation-state apart from main-
land China.
3. Governmental Sovereignty and Independence
Independent of any external governing body, Taiwan's gov-
ernment does the following: enacts legislation and rules of order
which govern Taiwan, conducts and controls Taiwan's foreign af-
fairs and policies, oversees and authorizes negotiation and entry
into international agreements, enacts and enforces Taiwan's immi-
gration policies, and makes all decisions relating to the common
health and welfare of the island's inhabitants. The PRC has no in-
put into the drafting or implementation of any of these policies or
decisions. The reality is that the government on Taiwan operates
completely independent of the PRC, which it could not do if the
PRC exercised de facto sovereignty over Taiwan.
4. Membership in Various ILOs and NGOs
Membership in either international governmental organiza-
tions (IGOs) or international non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) is not dispositive of determining whether an international
entity has acquired the status of statehood. Nevertheless, mem-
bership in such organizations serves as a strong indicator of the
recognition accorded to that entity by the international commu-
90. See generally Y. DOLLY HWANG, THE RISE OF A NEW WORLD ECONOMIC
POWER: POSTWAR TAIWAN (1991).
91. See id at 99 (discussing development of Taiwan's financial system and monetary
policies).
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nity.92
Taiwan sought membership in a number of IGOs, particularly
those in which membership garners diplomatic leverage. The
PRC, however, successfully blocked Taiwan's entrance into many
of these organizations. 93 Despite the efforts of the Chinese gov-
ernment, Taiwan has nevertheless successfully achieved member-
ship in several IGOs.94 Taiwan recently submitted an application
for membership in the World Trade Organization, separate and
apart from mainland China.95
Despite the PRC's protests, Taiwan has been more successful
in its search for membership in a number of sporting, scientific,
humanitarian, and cultural NGOs.96 Since 1994, when it declared
that it would no longer compete with the PRC in seeking to repre-
sent China, Taiwan has sought membership to IGOs and NGOs, in
its own right.
B. The Principle of Self-Determination
The disparity between Taiwan and China regarding their re-
spective roles and responsibilities in the global community compli-
92. See, e.g., David 0. Lloyd, Succession, Secession, and State Membership in the
United Nations, 26 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 761, 766 (1994) (discussing recognition of
statehood through membership in United Nations); see also Michael C. Davis, The Con-
cept of Statehood and the Status of Taiwan, 4 J. CHINESE L. 135 (1990) (discussing possible
interpretations of Taiwan's membership in various IGOs and NGOs with regard to the
status of Taiwan).
93. See G. CHAN, CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, PARTICIPATION
IN NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS SINCE 1971, at 159, 160 (1989).
94. For example, Taiwan joined the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1966 as a
founding member and remained a member following the PRC's acceptance as a separate
member. See id. at 160.
95. China opposes Taiwan's membership to the WTO, but cannot completely block
Taiwan's membership application because China does not yet belong to the WTO. Re-
sorting to the political arena, China demanded that the WTO admit China prior to ad-
mitting Taiwan. Interview with Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky (November 1995).
Taiwan, meanwhile, is not insensitive to the implications of its application for WTO
membership. In its application to the WTO under Article 33 of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Charter, Taiwan applied under the name of "the Customs
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu," demonstrating that it was not seeking
a political or symbolic advantage in its application. See Mou-shih Ding, Relations Between
the United States and the Republic of China, in THE ROLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 55 (Ray S. Cline ed., 1991).
96. Those organizations and institutions, do not consider Taiwan to be synonymous
with China. Instead, these organizations refer to Taiwan by various designations as
"Taiwan, China," or "Chinese Taipei," distinguishing it from the PRC. See Michael C.




cates the Taiwan-China dilemma. For example, discussions re-
garding the Taiwan issue inevitably lead to the question of
whether the people of Taiwan are Chinese or Taiwanese. Moreo-
ver, far-reaching ramifications result when both the historical and
ongoing discussions regarding the Taiwan issue consist of numer-
ous references to it as a matter "the Chinese people" must resolve.
People of Chinese descent comprise the vast majority of the
Taiwanese population. Many of their ancestors immigrated to
Taiwan during the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries from the south-
eastern Chinese provinces of Fujian and Guandong. 97 The Dutch,
Portuguese, and Japanese settlers who, at various points in history
maintained ports and colonies throughout Taiwan, intermingled
with the these immigrants through marriage. Thus, "Taiwanese"
usually refers to the generations of island dwellers who inhabited
Taiwan prior to the influx of the Kuomintang. They constitute ap-
proximately 85% of Taiwan's population.
This set of circumstances regarding ethnic identification gives
rise to consideration of whether the principle of self-determination
applies to the situation existing between Taiwan and China. Self-
determination is premised on "the right of a people to declare and
establish its own sovereign state freely."' 98 Until 1993, the native
Taiwanese population has been subject to either military occupa-
tion or rule by a foreign governing power without choice. Being
denied participation in determining the fate of their home island
has greatly contributed to the current indeterminate status of Tai-
wan's international personality. Allowing the native Taiwanese to
exercise control would help rectify the exclusionary practices to
which foreign governments have subjected the Taiwanese.
Traditionally, self-determination was interpreted narrowly,
referring to the right of peoples who were forced to submit to for-
eign colonizing powers to seek their own political destinies. 99 Re-
cently, however, the concept of self-determination has been inter-
preted more broadly. For example, self-determination now
97. In addition, small numbers of aboriginal peoples still exist today in Taiwan,
mostly in pockets of reserved land (such as Wu-Lai). They rely on tourist trade and both
Taiwanese and foreign curiosity regarding aboriginal customs, song and dance. These
people account for less than one percent of the current Taiwanese population. See LONG,
supra note 1, at 3.
98. Chang & Lim, supra note 22, at 399.
99. The concept of self-determination has its inception in a moral mandate directed
at decolonizing European and Japanese colonies during the period following World War
II. See Franck, supra note 78, at 54.
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arguably includes a claim for independence by minority ethnic, re-
ligious and/or linguistic groups subordinated by a dominant popu-
lation and who seek political and actual autonomy.
A number of international instruments recognize the validity
of self-determination. 100 For example, the International Court of
Justice has expressly affirmed it.101 Likewise, a number of Gen-
eral Assembly resolutions, while having no direct legal binding na-
ture, also validate the right to self-determination. For example,
Resolution 2160 (XXI) affirmed that:
Any forcible action, direct or indirect, which deprives people
under foreign domination of their right to self-determination
and freedom and independence and of their right to determine
freely their political status and pursue their economic, social
and cultural development constitutes a violation of the Charter
of the United Nations. Accordingly, the "use of force to de-
prive peoples of their national identity .... constitutes a viola-
tion of their inalienable rights and the principle of non-
intervention. " 102
As previously discussed, upon its arrival in Taiwan in the
1940's, the KMT treated the native Taiwanese harshly and sub-
jected them to political suppression. 103 Prior to the KMT's arrival,
various foreign powers, including the Portuguese, Dutch and Japa-
nese had subjected Taiwan to colonial occupation and rule. 104
Once the KMT took control, it ruled the Taiwanese with an iron
fist for over forty years. The KMT excluded the Taiwanese from
political participation, and subjected the Taiwanese to numerous
human rights violations based on their ethnicity, and their social
and political group membership.105 Moreover, the KMT perse-
100. See, e.g., Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, G.A. Res 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 138-39, U.N. Doc.
A/4684 (1960). The Charter of the United Nations also expressly mentions "self-
determination" twice: first, in Article 1(2) setting forth "respect for the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples" as one of the purposes of the United Nations;
second, in Article 55, where the same language is set forth as one of the general objec-
tives of the United Nations in the areas of social and economic development and respect
for human rights. U.N. CHARTER arts. 1(2), 55.
101. Namibia Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. Rep. 6, 31; Western Sahara Case, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 31-
3.
102. G.A. Res. 2160, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 1482d plen. mtg., Supp. No. 16, at 4,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
103. See discussion supra Part II.
104. See discussion supra Part I.
105. See, e.g., Ming-Min Peng, Political Offenses in Taiwan: Laws and Problems, 47
CHINA Q. 471-74 (1971); Tak-Wing Ngo, Civil Society and Political Liberalization in Tai-
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cuted the Taiwanese for speaking in their native tongues. The
KMT mandated that the Taiwanese speak and learn only the
KMT's imported language, Mandarin Chinese, which was the only
language permitted to be taught in schools and used in transacting
business. 106 International law recognizes discrimination and per-
secution based upon ethnolinguistic differences as a violation of
human rights.10
7
Today, the Taiwanese people have overcome these barriers,
including adoption of a democratic governance. Given the inter-
national community's recognition of the validity of the right of
self-determination and it applicability to this situation, Taiwan
should be permitted to exercise its right of self-determination and
to decide its own destiny.
C. Taiwan's "Quasi-declaration" of Independence
The creation of states in the international arena is tradition-
ally accompanied by a declaration of independence by the entity
seeking statehood. In Taiwan's case, such an official declaration
has not been made. The PRC argues that the absence of such a
declaration by Taiwan signifies Taiwan's acquiescence to the
PRC's position. The PRC's position is that determination of Tai-
wan's fate is an internal matter to be decided by the Chinese and
that eventual reunification of Taiwan with China is inevitable.
That Taiwan has not yet made such an express claim of inde-
pendence and thus forced the issue is understandable. Assuming
that Taiwan desired to seek independence as a sovereign nation,
one major reason for the absence of such a declaration could be
the Kuomintang. While severely weakened compared to its
wan, 25 BULL. CONCERNED ASIAN SCHOLARS 4, 5 (1993) ("By repressing political iden-
tities, and by denying freedom of speech, association, and other civil and political rights,
the ruling party tried to destroy self-organized and autonomously defined political spaces,
substituting for them a state-controlled public arena.").
106. The majority of the native Taiwanese spoke a dialect known as Hoklo, while a
smaller sub-group of Taiwanese spoke another dialect known as Hakka. The aboriginal
peoples likewise had their own languages which were different from both Hoklo and
Hakka and are presumed to have arisen from a different linguistic base than either of the
other two. Although there is evidence to support that both Hoklo and Hakka originated
as dialects of the Chinese language, from a purely linguistic point of view, Hoklo and
Hakka are distinct languages from Mandarin. See Chang & Lim, supra note 22, at 414.
107. See id. at 414-15. "For example, South Africa for a long time faced UN censure
because of its state policy of discrimination against the black majority population. One
manifestation of apartheid was discrimination based on language, in violation of a funda-
mental freedom affirmed by the UN Charter." Id. (footnotes omitted).
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strength at the time of its takeover of the island, the Kuomintang
still holds most of the power in Taiwan.108 The KMT justified its
iron rule over Taiwan (including forty years of martial law) and
centered its political stance upon its claim of sovereignty over both
Taiwan and China. The KMT saw itself in the midst of a civil war
with China, the outcome of which would result in the reunification
of both countries.
A second, even more powerful and obvious reason for the ab-
sence of such a declaration by the Taiwanese, is the justifiable fear
of invasion by the PRC.109 China has made clear that it will not
hesitate to use force in order to enforce its claim of sovereignty
over the island.
In light of these circumstances, it is reasonable to look to Tai-
wan's conduct, even absent an express declaration of independ-
ence, to determine Taiwan's position regarding its international
status. Taiwan's behavior since the establishment of its democratic
government indicates the island's movement towards acquiring in-
dependence. Nonetheless, Taiwan understandably would prefer to
do so without raising the direct ire and armed wrath of its territo-
rial neighbor, China.
1. In General
The KMT has made a series of unwise strategic decisions
which have contributed to Taiwan's inability to gain recognition as
sovereign nation.110 A strong argument exists, however, that the
KMT does not speak for the majority of the island's population,
the so-called native Taiwanese. With the emergence of Taiwan's
democratic government, it is clear that the fundamental change
which Taiwan has undergone in the past decade demands a reas-
sessment of Taiwan's position in the international community.
Moreover, a re-examination of the evidence regarding the de facto
108. While the KMT does retain control over Taiwan's governing bodies, the effects of
the DPP and the Taiwan independence movement are obvious. The hard line against any
sort of action which would undermine the KMT's claim to be the legitimate government
of all China steadily eroded over time. In May of 1991, President Lee Teng-hui (who is a
member of the KMT) expressly denounced Taiwan's claim to have sovereignty over
China. Furthermore, while the KMT has not embraced the independence movement in
Taiwan, it has moved to the center sufficiently enough that a splinter group made up of
die-hard "old liners" has formed and named itself the New Party.
109. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
110. See, e.g., supra note 117 and accompanying text (discussing the KMT's discussion
to challenge the PRC for representation of China, rather than accepting proposal to have
both China and Taiwan recognized by the United Nations).
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status of Taiwan's international personality must be done.
In 1988, Taiwan altered its foreign policy approach towards
international recognition. Taiwan previously had mirrored the
PRC's efforts in demanding that other countries recognize either
the KMT or the PRC. Taiwan has changed this position. No
longer does Taiwan require any declaration of acknowledgment or
recognition of Taiwan's international status. 111 Rather, Taiwan
now welcomes unconditionally any state willing to recognize Tai-
wan.
In 1991, Taiwan informally recognized the PRC. In 1994,
Taiwan officially announced that it would no longer seek to repre-
sent China in the international community. Moreover, Taiwan
seeks membership in both NGOs and IGOs, and engages in behav-
ior that indicates its desire for recognition, with the omission only
of an outright declaration of the island's sovereignty.
2. Taiwan's Quest for Admission to the United Nations
Taiwan finds itself excluded from membership in the United
Nations, which many scholars consider the seminal international
organization. While lack of membership in the U.N. does not de-
prive a state of its sovereignty, U.N. membership signifies recogni-
tion of an entity's international status as a nation-state by the in-
ternational community. 112
In 1993, Taiwan directly applied for membership to the
United Nations.11 3 The PRC strenuously objected to Taiwan's
application, and blocked the application from being included on
the daily agenda of the General Assembly for discussion and a
possible vote. In 1994, the PRC again blocked Taiwan's applica-
tion for membership to the United Nations. 114
111. See Lee, supra note 13, at 354; Davis, note supra 92, at 323.
112. See Lloyd, supra note 92, at 766-67 (1994). "In most cases, acceptance by the
United Nations indicates that a new state has come into being, and that the international
system will treat the new entity as a state." Id. The classic exception to this principle is
Switzerland, whose sovereignty is undisputed despite its non-membership in the United
Nations. See id.
113. See supra note 10. Request to include the Republic of China U.N. Membership
Issue in the Agenda of the 48th Sess. of the UNGA, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Annex 4, at
4, U.N. Doc. A/48/191 (1993), reprinted in 11 CHINESE Y.B. INT'L L. & AFF. 261-65
(1991-1992). The issue of Taiwan separately applying for membership to the U.N.
emerged in 1986 when the DPP was established. As part of its opening attack against the
KMT, the DPP openly advocated U.N. membership for Taiwan. For further discussion of
Taiwan's bid for U.N. membership, see Chang & Lim, supra note 22.
114. See id
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Pursuant to the Charter of the United Nations, only states
may apply for membership to the U.N..115 The Charter further
mandates that the Security Council must approve any membership
vote by the General Assembly. 116 Even assuming that the General
Assembly approved Taiwan's membership to the U.N., China
could veto this vote because it retains a permanent seat on the Se-
curity Council.117 Thus, while Taiwan has probably not aban-
doned its quest for U.N. membership, it is unlikely that Taiwan's
bid for membership will be successful in the near term.118
Nevertheless, the failure to obtain recognition from the
United Nations as a sovereign nation does not eliminate Taiwan's
claim to sovereignty. A refusal of individual nations or an inter-
national organization to recognize an emerging state "[does] not
mean that it is not a state, nor is the international system barred
from recognizing it as such." 119 Regardless of Taiwan's success in
acquiring recognition as a sovereign state via inclusion in the
United Nations, its application for U.N. membership represents
Taiwan's attempt to be recognized as a nation-state separate and
distinct from China. 120 Therefore, given China's threat of force if
Taiwan actually declares independence, Taiwan's behavior should
be seen as the equivalent of a declaration of independence. 121
C. "White cat, black cat. .... "
Taiwan undisputedly has the power and authority to act, and
has acted for more than the past four decades, as an independent
political entity. Taiwan clearly looks, acts, and functions like a
115. U.N. CHARTER arts. 3,4.
116. See id art. 4.
117. Former U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's statement that "there is
only one China... we refuse any contact, direct or indirect, with Taiwan," indicates that
China's-presence on the Security Council may not be the only obstacle that Taiwan faces
in its quest for U.N. membership. U.N. Adheres to One China Position: U.N. Chief,
XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, (Sept. 5, 1994), available in LEXIS, AsiaPC Library, Xinhua
File.
118. This situation is ironic considering that, in the years preceding Taiwan's ouster
from the China seat in the United Nations, many U.N. member states, including the
United States, Canada, Italy and Saudi Arabia, sought to have both Taiwan and the PRC
represented in the United Nations. Both governments rejected this compromise, resulting
in Taiwan's complete exclusion from the U.N. when its delegation was removed in Octo-
ber of 1971. See generally Chang & Lim, supra note 65.
119. Lloyd, supra note 92, at 766.
120. Pursuant to the Charter of the United Nations, only states can become members.
See U.N. CHARTER arts. 3, 4.
121. See Lee, supra note 13, at 381-82.
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sovereign nation according to the common indicators of state-
hood.122 Taiwan has expressed its desire for independence by its
conduct. Taiwan might have already explicitly sought recognition
as a nation-state from other nations had China not refused to re-
linquish its claim of sovereignty over the island and threatened to
use force against Taiwan to enforce that claim.
But for China's claim of sovereignty over Taiwan, Taiwan's
route to statehood (if it desired it) would be unobstructed. For
China's position to be justifiable, however, its claim to sovereignty
over Taiwan must, at a minimum, be legitimate. As the next sec-
tion of this Article discusses, the validity of China's claim is far
from clear.
V. CHINA'S CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER TAIWAN
How can any system of law admit that right is based on might?
This is what is involved if in the relations between States interna-
tional law accepts that the stronger nation may impose its terms on
the weaker nation by war or by threat of force.123
The PRC asserts that it should exercise indisputable sover-
eignty over Taiwan, and that Taiwan's sovereignty is a matter of
"internal affairs" not subject to international law.124 The PRC's
position ignores the undetermined status of the legal ownership of
Taiwan, as well as contrary indications supporting Taiwan's inde-
pendence from China.125 Particularly in light of principles of self-
determination and democratic governance, resolution of Taiwan's
international personality and future should not and cannot rest
upon China's unilateral assertion of sovereignty over Taiwan and
its people.
Nevertheless, the PRC continues to insist that Taiwan remains
part of China and to use coercive tactics in its maneuvering. For
example, the PRC, in extending diplomatic relations with other
countries, demands that those countries recognize Beijing as the
sole legitimate government of China and recognize China's claim
122. See, e.g., THE ROLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY, at v-vi (Ray S. Cline ed., 1991). "By all standards of statehood, [Taiwan] is
an independent self-governing nation with an inherent right of self-defense." Iti
123. J.A.S. GRENVILLE, THE MAJOR INTERNATIONAL TREATIES 1914-1973: A
HISTORY AND GUIDE WITH TEXTS 13 (1974).
124. See Envoy to UN Reiterates China's Position on Taiwan Question, BBC
SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, July 25, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws file.
125. See supra Part III.A, B.
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of sovereignty over Taiwan. 126
A. China's White Paper on Taiwan
On August 31, 1993, the PRC issued a White Paper on Tai-
wan, entitled "The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China"
(White Paper).127 In the White Paper, the PRC articulated its ra-
tionale for why Taiwan does not constitute a sovereign nation in-
dependent from China and provided numerous justifications for its
legitimacy to govern Taiwan. 128 To date, the White Paper repre-
sents the PRC's most comprehensive statement regarding its posi-
tion on Taiwan's status.129 Throughout the White Paper, the PRC
reiterates its position that the Taiwan question is a purely internal
and domestic matter.130
The primary assertions set forth in the White Paper are as
follows:
1. The Shimonoseki Treaty of 1895 was rendered null and void
by China's declaration of war against Japan in 1941.
2. The 1943 Cairo Declaration stated that territories stolen
from China, including Taiwan and the Pescadores, should be
restored to China.
3. The 1945 Potsdam Proclamation affirmed the terms of the
1943 Cairo Declaration.
4. In its 1945 instrument of surrender, Japan agreed to carry
out the terms of the Potsdam Proclamation.
5. On October 25, 1945, the Japanese surrendered Taiwan to
126. The language incorporated into the text of the governing agreements between
China and those countries, however, varies widely. A strong case can be made that the
majority of those governments which have diplomatic ties with the PRC carefully word
their agreements so that the issue of Taiwan remains undetermined. See Lee, supra note
13, at 357-60 (analyzing the language contained in the agreements of 123 countries with
established diplomatic ties to the PRC and concluding that there are potentially as many
as 111 states which are noncommittal regarding the PRC's claim of sovereignty over Tai-
wan).
127. Taiwan Affairs Office & Information Office State Council, The Taiwan Question
and Reunification of China (Beijing 1993) (in English) [hereinafter White Paper]. For
Taiwan's countering commentary to the PRC's release of the White Paper see There is no
"Taiwan Question" There is Only a "China Question": Views on the Chinese Communists'
White Paper, "The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China" 1-14 (Mainland Affairs
Council, Republic of China ed., 1993).
128. White Paper, supra note 127.
129. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 13, at 354-55.
130. See White Paper, supra note 127.
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the Chinese government in Taiwan. Under Chinese law, Tai-
wan was restored to China on that day.
6. Over 157 countries maintain official diplomatic relations
with China, and recognize that there is only one China, that the
PRC is the sole legitimate government of China, and that Tai-
wan constitutes a part of China.
7. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI)
resolved the question of China's sovereignty over Taiwan.
131
The PRC's assertions, however, contain numerous flaws and ma-
terial omissions that render its claim of sovereignty over Taiwan
meaningless.
1. China's Geographical and Historical Claim
China's geographical claim of sovereignty over Taiwan, es-
tablished in 1684 when Taiwan became a prefecture and military
district of Fujian province, came into dispute when Taiwan was
ceded to Japan pursuant to the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki.
132
The island remained under the full custody and control of Japan
until the Allied Forces forced Japan to relinquish Taiwan and the
Pescadores at the end of World War 11.133 China never partici-
pated in the efforts to wrest ownership of Taiwan from Japan.
From 1895 to the present, the PRC has never exercised any control
or sovereignty over the territory of Taiwan.
Therefore, any Chinese claim of ownership must arise from
the international instruments which forced Japan to surrender
Taiwan. The Japanese forces surrendered to the island's govern-
mental forces in 1945.134 As a condition of its surrender, Japan
unconditionally relinquished its claim to Taiwan. 135 While Japan
expressly relinquished its claim to Taiwan and to the Pescadores, it
did not state to whom it relinquished its claim.136 The Japanese
forces surrendered themselves directly to the Nationalist govern-
131. Id.
132. See Encyclopedia of Asian History, supra note 2, at 52.
133. This decision was declared in the 1943 Cairo Declaration and affirmed in the 1945
Potsdam Proclamation. See Part III.
134. THE FUTURE OF TAIWAN: A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION, (Victor H. Li, ed. 1980).
135. The PRC did not participate in any of these negotiations, and it was not a signa-
tory to any of the operative instruments. See Soong, supra note 13, at 353.
136. Japan also did not express to whom it relinquished Taiwan and the Pescadores in
the separate peace treaty entered into between Japan and the KMT the next year. See
Lee, supra note 13, at 353.
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ment in Taipei, not to the PRC.137
2. U.N. Resolution 2758
The U.N. Resolution 2758, which established the PRC as the
legitimate representative of China in the United Nations, did not
address the Taiwan issue. 138 The PRC government, nevertheless,
claims the resolution represents more "proof" of the legitimacy of
its claims over Taiwan.
139
The reality, however, is that the PRC has never exercised de
facto control or jurisdiction over Taiwan. 140 At least two scholars
have propounded that, in the absence of de facto possession or
control, "state domestic jurisdiction cannot be invoked" in the
context of Taiwan and China.
141
3. Who speaks for the Chinese people?
Until recently, the majority of Taiwan's inhabitants were ex-
cluded from the political process and discriminated against on the
basis of ethnic and linguistic differences. In addition, prior to the
KMT, foreign governments occupied Taiwan, subjecting the Tai-
wanese to their rule and subjugation. These experiences under-
mine the PRC's claim that it speaks for "all Chinese," that all Chi-
nese agree that Taiwan is part of China, and that Taiwan must be
reunified with mainland China.142
Therefore, in light of the recent democratization of Taiwan,
accepting the current Taiwanese government's position on its in-
dependence is more in keeping with principles of international
law.
137. See generally id. at 371-74. The PRC has never had, nor has it ever gained or ex-
ercised, control over the territory of Taiwan. See id
138. See Section IV.D.; see also Li, supra note 134.
139. Lee, supra note 13, at 355.
140. See id at 356. One scholar has even opined the KMT's martial rule over Taiwan
from 1945 to 1951 should be categorized as a military occupation. See id
141. Chang & Lim, supra note 65, at 419 (quoting the International Court of Justice's
statement in the Aaland Islands Case that "[t]ransition from a de facto situation to a nor-
mal situation de jure cannot be considered as one confined entirely within the domestic
jurisdiction of a State.").
142. Recent surveys indicate that only five percent of Taiwanese favor swift reunifica-




B. China's Illegal Use of Aggressive Acts and Coercion
Because of its sheer size and diplomatic leverage, the PRC's
tactics against Taiwan's efforts to define its own international
identity creates an unequal playing field.143 Nations, including the
United States, are particularly reluctant to criticize the PRC about
the Taiwan issue because they are unwilling to jeopardize the
stability of their political and economic relations with China.
144
Furthermore, the PRC braces its claim of sovereignty over
Taiwan with illegal threats of force.145 For example, in July and
August of 1995, timed to coincide with several important sched-
uled elections in Taiwan, China began conducting a series of mili-
tary exercises in the Taiwan Straits, located between Taiwan and
Mainland China. Some of the exercises included launching mis-
siles within a few miles of Taiwan's perimeter. Consequently,
Taiwan's armed forces were put on alert. China conducted addi-
tional exercises in the Taiwan Straits in March of 1996. In re-
sponse, the United States sent warships from its Seventh Fleet into
the Taiwan Straits, which helped avert any further provocation
from either side.
The PRC also engages in diplomatic warfare against Taiwan-
ese relations. Using its political and economic leverage, China
demands that any country desiring to enter into diplomatic rela-
tions with it must cut off ties with Taiwan. China also requires that
these countries recognize the PRC as the sole legitimate govern-
ment of China, and to acknowledge China's claim of sovereignty
over Taiwan. The PRC's demands forced many nations to exam-
ine and adjust their diplomatic positions to appease the PRC.146
The PRC's position on this issue has forced nations to become in-
volved in extended discussions over the wording of diplomatic in-
struments to satisfy the PRC's demands while not entirely severing
143. A parallel can be drawn between China's and Taiwan's position to unequal trea-
ties. In accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, treaties which
have been "imposed" or forced upon weaker parties are considered null and void as a re-
sult of the inequality existing between the parties to that treaty. See, e.g., INGRID
DELUPIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE INDEPENDENT STATE 142 (1987) (discussing
voidability of unequal treaties and repudiation of treaties established under force).
144. See, e.g., Morton I. Abramowitz, How to Think About China, NEWSWEEK, June
16, 1997, at 43.
145. The United Nations prohibits the use of force except as mandated by the Security
Council or in self-defense. See U.N. CHARTER ch. VII, art. 51.
146. One example of how more reluctant nations react is Canada. See discussion supra
note 15 and accompanying text.
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their relations with Taiwan.
China's use of economic and diplomatic coercion to force
other states to explicitly deny their recognition of Taiwan is illegal.
International law provides that states may not infringe on another
state's sovereignty by forcing or coercing that state to engage in
actions against its will. Moreover, China's threat to use force
against Taiwan if it declares its independence is an act of aggres-
sion which contravenes the principles of international law.
VI. THE UNITED STATES' POSITION ON TAIWAN
According to what is probably still the predominant view in the
literature of international law, recognition of States is not a matter
governed by law but a question of policy. 147
United States foreign policy toward Taiwan has been instru-
mental in determining Taiwan's past, current, and future status
and treatment within the international community.148
The U.S. had a paramount interest in protecting Taiwan dur-
ing the early years of the Cold War because of the island's strate-
gic geographical position. Taiwan's location allowed the U.S. to
effect its policy in extending and establishing the U.S. presence in
the Asian arena to confront Communist forces, viz., the U.S.S.R.
and China. During this period, the U.S. was a staunch ally and
supporter of Taiwan.149
As time passed, however, U.S. foreign policy shifted to reflect
the inclusion of the PRC in the international community. 150 The
initiation of diplomatic overtures by President Richard Nixon in
1971 undermined Taiwan's precarious position. 151 On October 25,
1971, the General Assembly voted on what delegation would rep-
147. HERSH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1947).
148. Comprehensive treatment of the relationship between the United States, China
and Taiwan is beyond the scope of this article. For an in-depth analysis and discussion of
this subject, see Stephen Lee, American Policy Toward Taiwan: The Issue of De Facto and
De Jure Status of Taiwan and Sovereignty, 2 BuFF. J. INT'L L. 323 (1995-96). See generally
LUNG-CHU CHEN & HAROLD D. LASSWELL, FORMOSA, CHINA, AND THE UNITED
NATIONS (1967).
149. For instance, the United States protected the KMT's possession of the China seat
in the United Nations for nearly twenty-two years, blocking the issue of Chinese repre-
sentation from being presented to the General Assembly. The U.S. delegation classified
the China issue as an "important matter" which required a two-thirds majority vote in the
General Assembly to be placed on the U.N. agenda for discussion. See Baehr & Gor-





resent China in the United Nations. As a result, the PRC was
seated in the United Nations.
152
In 1972, then-U.S. President Richard M. Nixon signed the
Shanghai Communiqu6, which stated:
The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side
of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and Tai-
wan is a part of China. The United States does not challenge
that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of
the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.
153
The 1978 Communiqu6 on the Establishment of Diplomatic
Relations between the U.S. and the PRC, negotiated by President
Jimmy Carter, provides that:
The United States of America and the People's Republic of
China have agreed to recognize each other and to establish
diplomatic relations as of January 1, 1979. The United States of
America recognizes the Government of the People's Republic
of China as the sole legal Government of China .... The Gov-
ernment of the United States of America acknowledges the
Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part
of China. 15
4
On January 1, 1979, the United States withdrew its recogni-
tion of the Kuomintang as the official government of China, and
transferred that recognition to the PRC on the mainland. 155 At
the same time, however, the United States enacted the Taiwan
Relations Act (TRA).156 The TRA effectively allows the United
States to treat Taiwan as a state regardless of the withdrawal of
recognition of Taiwan as the representative government of
China. 157  Despite Taiwan's de-recognition, however, United
States courts continued to recognize and enforce aspects of Tai-
152. See id.
153. See U.S.-People's Republic of China: Joint Communiqud, Feb. 28, 1972, 11 ILM
443,445 (1972).
154. Id. at 445.
155. See id.
156. Pub. L. No. 96-8, 93 Stat. 14 (1979). For discussion of the Taiwan Relations Act
(TRA), see Lori Damrosch, The Taiwan Relations Act After Ten Years, 3 J. CHIN. L. 157
(1989).
157. See J. Terry Emerson, ROC's International Position and the Taiwan Relations Act
in THE ROLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 83, 85
(Ray S. Cline ed. 1991) "[T]he TRA has given Taiwan a political identity for purposes of
U.S. law in which the right of free Chinese to self-government within the institutions of a
modern civil society are affirmed, recognized, and secured." Id.
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wan's sovereignty in applying international law.158 Despite the ab-
sence of official diplomatic relations, the United States maintains
"unofficial" relations with Taiwan through its American Institute
in Taiwan, which mirrors the official diplomatic channels existing
between the United States and other countries. 159
Not surprisingly, some believe that the TRA essentially con-
stitutes "a complex tool that enables the United States to stay in-
volved on both sides of the Taiwan Strait while leaving Taiwan
worried whether it will be abandoned. '160 Given the U.S. position
in the global community and its acknowledged bargaining strength,
the United States must reconsider its current policy towards both
China and Taiwan. The international community undoubtedly will
look to the U.S. in any efforts to resolve the Taiwan issue.
VII. CONCLUSION
Taiwan is already a de facto sovereign nation. It has been
denied actual recognition, however, as a result of both the confu-
sion created by the historical acceptance that the KMT spoke on
behalf of the Taiwanese people, the ambiguity of the stance taken
by the KMT that Taiwan also adopted the "one China" policy, and
by China's consistent (albeit unjustified) refusal to relinquish its
claim of sovereignty over Taiwan.
Today, Taiwan has come into its own identity while struggling
to assert its international personality. By a number of indicators,
Taiwan is seeking outright independence for which it has labored
long and hard, and which it deserves. Nevertheless, it is still de-
nied the opportunity to openly declare its sovereignty, as a result
of the illegal and coercive tactics exercised by China in both
threatening to use military force if Taiwan declared its independ-
ence and threatening to cut off access to China's markets to those
countries which express support for Taiwan's position.
158. See, e.g., Chang v. Northwestern Hospital, 506 F. Supp. 975 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Mil-
len Industries v. CCNAA, 855 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1988); United States v. 594,464 Pounds
of Salmon, 871 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1989); New York Chinese TV Programs v. U.E. Enter-
prises, No. 88 CIV.4170 (S.D.N.Y., March 8, 1989). Likewise, courts of other nations
have also striven to resolve issues regarding the legitimacy of Taiwan's sovereignty
against China's. See supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the Maersk Dubai case).
159. The American Institute in Taiwan is staffed by foreign civil officers "on leave"
who are granted essentially the same rights to which they would be entitled if they were
on official assignment elsewhere in the world. Taiwan maintains a reciprocal office in the
United States, the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office.
160. Davis, supra note 92, at 148.
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Clearly, this situation cannot last forever; 61 Taiwan cannot
acquire its deserved recognition as a nation-state unless it is given
the express support from the international community. This sup-
port must be initiated from the rest of the world, ideally led by the
United States, as Taiwan can do no more. The world must also
explicitly state that any use of force by the PRC to enforce its
claim of sovereignty over Taiwan will not be tolerated. If the
principles of self-determination, human rights, and democratic
governance are to have any meaning, then Taiwan's right to
choose and declare independence-if it so desires-should be
handed to the Taiwanese people unfettered and with open hands.
161. The urgency of a resolution is clearer in light of the recent handover of Hong
Kong to China. Immediately after the handover, Chinese officials remarked that the re-
unification of Hong Kong was analogous to what would occur with Taiwan. See Taiwan:
Now, supra note 142.
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